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INTRODUCTION
Arrested for interstate drug trafficking in New Mexico, “Stew-
art” agreed to cooperate with authorities and testify against his co-
defendants.1  The government filed Stewart’s plea agreement with
the court, and an electronic version became available for download
on the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) ser-
vice.2  Shortly thereafter, Stewart’s PACER files were featured on
whosarat.com,3 a website that claims to have exposed the identities
of more than 4,300 cooperating witnesses and 400 undercover
agents.4  In an effort to intimidate Stewart from testifying, his co-
defendants plastered the whosarat.com materials, which labeled
Stewart a “rat and a snitch,”5 on utility poles and windshields in
Stewart’s neighborhood, and sent them by direct mail to residents
in the area.6  As a result, Stewart was forced to move to an undis-
1. Letter from Michael A. Battle, Dir., Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to James C. Duff, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Dec. 6,
2006), available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/summaries/briefs/06/
06-2136/Filed_01-31-2007_ProsecutorsSupplementalCommentsAppendix.pdf.
2. Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) is an electronic public
access service that allows users to obtain case information from the federal courts.
PACER offers “an inexpensive, easy-to-use alternative for obtaining case information
without having to visit the courthouse.  PACER allows an Internet user to request
information about a particular case or party.  The data is immediately available for
printing or downloading.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PACER INFORMA-
TION BROCHURE, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/documents/pacer_brochure.pdf (last
visited Sept. 7, 2008).
3. Letter from Michael A. Battle to James C. Duff, supra note 1. R
4. Adam Liptak, Web Sites Listing Informants Concern Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/22/washington/
22plea.html (stating that many of those cooperators and undercover agents cata-
logued on whosarat.com were identified due to “documents obtained from court files
available on the Internet”).
5. Emilie Lounsberry, Stoking a Culture of Fear for Witnesses, PHILA. INQUIRER,
July 26, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Lounsberry, Stoking a Culture of Fear].
6. See Letter from Michael A. Battle to James C. Duff, supra note 1; see also R
Emilie Lounsberry, Site that Snitches on Snitches Irks Judges, PHILA. INQUIRER, July
22, 2007, at A1.
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closed location, and the FBI opened an investigation into the
matter.7
Such widespread electronic access to case files gives rise to se-
curity concerns previously unrealized in the era of paper records.
As the United States Department of Justice noted, the emergence
of a “cottage industry” of websites that republishes court filings
online for the purposes of witness intimidation, retaliation, and
harassment poses “a grave risk of harm” to cooperating witnesses
and defendants.8  Accordingly, the benefits associated with the re-
mote electronic availability and dissemination of judicial docu-
ments may come at a considerable cost.9
This Note describes the options that district courts within the
Second Circuit could implement sua sponte to mitigate these con-
cerns.10  For example, courts may adopt a local rule or protocol
that curtails electronic access to plea agreements in response to the
risks effectuated by PACER.  This medium-based approach suffers
from a number of practical and legal deficiencies, including the vio-
lation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1, which does not
permit categorical protective orders.  Alternatively, rather than
modifying access rights depending upon the medium through
which access is sought, courts may seek to prohibit all access to
sensitive filings through categorical sealing measures.  This ap-
proach is unworkable in the Second Circuit, which requires case-
by-case determinations with respect to motions to seal.  Finally,
courts may choose to reconsider which documents ought to be
maintained in the public record.  This Note concludes that the last
option is preferable due to its ability to withstand scrutiny under
both the access doctrine and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
49.1.
Part I of this Note outlines how electronic access to court filings
has altered the traditional balance between disclosure and privacy,
7. See Letter from Michael A. Battle to James C. Duff, supra note 1; see also R
Lounsberry, Stoking a Culture of Fear, supra note 5 (stating that a federal grand jury R
recently indicted the co-defendants for conspiracy and witness intimidation).
8. Letter from Michael A. Battle to James C. Duff, supra note 1. R
9. See, e.g., Associated Press, Judges Fear Dangers of Online ‘Rat’ Database, USA
TODAY, Nov. 30, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-30-informants_
x.htm.
10. Other approaches requiring extrajudicial action may be available.  For exam-
ple, the Department of Justice may revise the format of plea agreements in order to
contain hypothetical references to cooperation, while informing the court of actual
cooperation through another, non-public vehicle.  Similarly, Congress may consider
amending Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.  This Note focuses only on mea-
sures that courts could implement via local rules or protocols.
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and addresses the concerns associated with providing electronic ac-
cess to plea agreements.  Part I also outlines the qualified rights of
access to judicial documents under the common law and the First
Amendment.  These qualified rights may constrain the operation of
proposals that would limit nonparty remote access to court docu-
ments, a subject which is examined in Part II.  Finally, Part III ar-
gues that electronic access to court filings should be governed by
the same standards which regulate access to paper filings, and that
the proper inquiry is whether certain sensitive documents ought to
be included in the public record at all.  More specifically, Part III
recommends that plea agreements should not be filed with the
court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Rise of Electronic Access to Judicial Documents
Part I.A.1 of this Note discusses the implementation of the
PACER system, which permitted nonparties to access judicial doc-
uments electronically.  Part I.A.1 also examines the security and
privacy issues that may result from such access.  Parts I.A.2 and
I.A.3 outline the manners in which the Judicial Conference of the
United States and the Federal Rules Committee, respectively, have
responded to these issues.  As Part I.A.4 discusses, however, a
number of concerns remain prevalent.  The remainder of the Note
seeks to address the various policy alternatives that may mitigate
these lingering concerns.
1. The Demise of “Practical Obscurity”
Prior to the implementation of systems permitting remote elec-
tronic access to judicial documents, the public’s ability to inspect
court records depended on physical presence at the courthouse.11
The inherent limitations of paper recordkeeping thus rendered
public court filings “practically obscure.”12  The transaction costs of
document retrieval served as disincentives to pursuing access, since
records acquisition involved traveling to the court, waiting in line
at the clerk’s office, filling out the necessary paperwork and paying
11. ROBERT DEYLING, OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURT CASE FILES 1
(2003), available at http://www.law.qut.edu.au/files/04-30-2003-whitepaper1.pdf.
12. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 762, 780 (1989).
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the applicable photocopying charges.13  Even if an individual were
not deterred by these inconveniences, the disorganized and often
un-indexed nature of records themselves constituted a barrier to
access.  Paper documents were not infrequently “lost, disassem-
bled, or misfiled,”14 and were susceptible to a natural process of
decay15 that further limited the opportunity for public access.  This
“practical obscurity” often insulated litigants and third parties,
whose personal information16 appeared in court filings, from harm
that could result from the misuse of such information.17 Accord-
ingly, litigating in federal court did not seriously threaten the secur-
ity or privacy of most people despite the qualified right of access to
court filings.18
Technological innovation eroded this “practical obscurity” safe-
guard.19  In 2002, the federal judiciary began to implement the
Case Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system,20
which allows litigants to file pleadings, motions and petitions over
the Internet, and permits courts to maintain case documents in
electronic form.21  As of August 2007, over thirty-one million cases
throughout the country are on CM/ECF systems; ninety-nine per-
cent of the federal courts currently use these systems.22  CM/ECF
also provides courts with the ability to make judicial documents
accessible to the public.23 Remote electronic access is available
through the PACER service, which allows users to obtain docket
information and judicial records from federal appellate, district and
13. See Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records:  Balancing Judicial Accountability
and Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 316 (2004).
14. Gregory M. Silverman, Rise of the Machines:  Justice Information Systems and
the Question of Public Access to Court Records over the Internet, 79 WASH. L. REV.
175, 195 (2004).
15. Winn, supra note 13, at 316. R
16. See DEYLING, supra note 11, at 5 (“Case files may contain private or sensitive R
information such as medical records, employment records, detailed financial informa-
tion, tax returns, Social Security numbers, and other personal identifying
information.”).
17. Id.
18. Lewis A. Kaplan, Litigation, Privacy and the Electronic Age, 4 YALE SYMP. ON
L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2001).
19. Id. at 6.
20. U.S. Courts, Case Management/Electronic Case Files, http://www.uscourts.
gov/cmecf/cmecf.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
21. Id.
22. Press Release, U.S. Courts, Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/
ECF) (June. 2008), http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/documents/press.pdf.
23. Id.
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bankruptcy courts via the Internet.24  PACER facilitates the re-
search process through its U.S. Party/Case Index feature, which
permits nationwide searches to determine whether a party is in-
volved in federal litigation.25  Anyone with an Internet-equipped
computer may access PACER from anywhere in the world, at any
time, at a cost of eight cents per page downloaded.26  The federal
judiciary’s adoption of CM/ECF and PACER has thus eliminated
the shield of practical obscurity from what previously were “nomi-
nally” public court files.27
While CM/ECF and PACER have numerous benefits,28 the Su-
preme Court has recognized the troubling aspects of state-spon-
sored computerized information storage.  In United States
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, a Freedom of Information Act case,29 the Court noted that
there is a “vast difference between the public records that might be
found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives,
and local police stations, and a computerized summary located in a
single clearinghouse of information.”30  In Whalen v. Roe, the
24. U.S. Courts, PACER Overview, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Kaplan, supra note 18, ¶ 6; see also Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, R
Internet and Electronic Case Filing Raise Privacy Concerns, THE THIRD BRANCH,
June 2000, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/june00ttb/internet.html (“‘[P]ractical obscu-
rity’ ends when the court records become easily accessible and searchable electroni-
cally from remote locations—anywhere in the world and at any time of the day or
night.”).
28. An extensive analysis of the benefits of electronic access to judicial documents
is beyond the scope of this Note.  Such benefits, however, include the enhancement of
the accuracy and management of litigation records, a reduction in the delay of the
flow of information that may slow the adjudication process, and cost savings for the
judiciary, the bar, and litigants. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ELEC-
TRONIC CASE FILES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:  A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF
GOALS, ISSUES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD, 15-17 (1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/
casefiles/ecfmar97.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2008); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIARY PRIVACY POLICY, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JU-
DICIAL CONFERENCE POLICY ON PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC
CRIMINAL CASE FILES, http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/crimimpl.htm (last visited
Sept. 27, 2008) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION] (noting that electronic
access (1) allows “citizens the opportunity to see and understand the workings of the
court system”; (2) “‘levels the geographic playing field’ by allowing individuals not
located in proximity to the courthouse easy access to what already is public informa-
tion”; and (3) discourages the creation of a “cottage industry” engaged in copying
paper records and charging online access fees).
29. Because this is a Freedom of Information Act case, it is not directly applicable
to jurisprudence on access to judicial proceedings and documents.
30. 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989).
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Court elaborated on the harmful possibilities that such a computer-
ized clearinghouse creates.31  In that case, physicians and patients
challenged a state law requiring that prescriptions for dangerous
medicines be disclosed and retained electronically by the state for
five years.32  Although the Court determined that the law at issue
was a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power, it nonetheless
emphasized the risks associated with computerized data collec-
tion.33  The Court explained that
[w]e are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the ac-
cumulation of vast amounts of personal information in comput-
erized data banks or other massive government files.  The
collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security
benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our
Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all re-
quire the orderly preservation of great quantities of information,
much of which is personal in character and potentially embar-
rassing or harmful if disclosed.34
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan explained that the cen-
tral storage and accessibility of electronic data “vastly increase[s]
the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared
to say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity
of some curb on such technology.”35
The Court’s early discussions about the potentially harmful ef-
fects of technology on the adjudicatory process remain relevant fol-
lowing the implementation of PACER.  In this era of remote
electronic access to judicial documents, the “danger of mischief is
serious.”36  The prospect of unlimited electronic dissemination of
sensitive information contained in case files implicates privacy and
security concerns in a variety of contexts.  For example, the online
availability of tax returns and medical or employment records—
which case files often contain—may facilitate identity theft,37 stalk-
ing, harassment and violence toward victims.38  These security and
31. See 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
32. See id. at 593.
33. See, e.g., Winn, supra note 13, at 319. R
34. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
35. Id. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring).
36. Kaplan, supra note 18, ¶ 24. R
37. See COMM’N ON PUB. ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, REPORT TO THE CHIEF
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 9 (2004), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.
us/ip/publicaccess/Report_PublicAccess_CourtRecords.pdf.
38. See id. at 10.
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privacy issues give rise to a new chapter in the access versus closure
debate.
2. The Judicial Conference of the United States: Policy on
Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files
In response to the foregoing issues, the Judicial Conference of
the United States39 (“Conference”) undertook to develop a privacy
policy for public access to electronic case files.40  The Conference
formed a Privacy Subcommittee (“Subcommittee”) under the
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management
(“CACM”) to develop a nationwide federal court electronic access
privacy policy.41  Based on public comments and information from
academics, judges, court clerks and government agencies, the Sub-
committee recommended a policy that the Conference adopted in
September 2001.42
The 2001 Report addressed civil, criminal, bankruptcy and ap-
pellate case files separately.  The Conference determined that, in
civil cases, documents should be made available online to the same
extent that they are available at the courthouse, with two excep-
tions: Social Security case files should not be accessible electroni-
cally, and personal identifiers43 should be partially redacted
depending on whether the particular document is filed electroni-
cally or at the courthouse.44  Two main policy concerns underlie
this “public is public” approach.  First, the Conference sought to
“level the geographic playing field” by facilitating access to court
documents for attorneys not located in geographic proximity to the
courthouse.45  Second, the Conference sought to discourage the de-
39. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000) (“The Chief Justice of the United States shall summon
annually the chief judge of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of Inter-
national Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit to a conference . . .
known as the Judicial Conference of the United States.”).  The purpose of the Confer-
ence is, in part, to address any matters in respect of which the administration of justice
in the courts may be improved. The Conference shall “submit suggestions and recom-
mendations to the various courts to promote uniformity of management procedures
and the expeditious conduct of court business.” Id.
40. Id.
41. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS
TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES ¶ 1 (2001), available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/
Policy.htm [hereinafter 2001 REPORT].
42. Id. ¶ 5.
43. Personal identifiers include Social Security numbers, dates of birth, financial
account numbers, and names of minor children. See, e.g., id. ¶ 18.
44. Id.
45. Id. ¶ 21.
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velopment of a “cottage industry” of data re-sellers who, if remote
access were restricted, would travel to the courthouse, copy the
files at issue, publish the information on a website and profit by
charging access fees.46
The 2001 Report recommended the prohibition of remote elec-
tronic access to criminal case files, with the understanding that the
Conference would revisit the issue within two years.47  The Confer-
ence determined that the safety and law enforcement risks of pro-
viding electronic access to criminal files outweighed the benefits48
of access.  The 2001 Report warned that information in criminal
case filings could “very easily be used to intimidate, harass, and
possibly harm victims, defendants and their families.”49  Further,
the Conference found that remote electronic access to criminal
case files could “increase the risk of unauthorized public access to
pre-indictment information, such as unexecuted arrest warrants
and search warrants.”50  Such access could “severely hamper” law
enforcement investigations and pose a “significant” safety risk to
law enforcement officials.51  The Conference also advised that seal-
ing documents containing sensitive information would “not ade-
quately address the problem, since the mere fact that a document is
sealed signals probable defendant cooperation and covert law en-
forcement initiatives.”52
Pursuant to the 2001 Report’s recommendation for further study
of the issue in the criminal context, the Conference established a
pilot project allowing eleven courts to provide remote electronic
access to criminal case files.53  The two-year study found no in-
stances of harm resulting from remote public access.54  Moreover,
when judges were asked about restrictions on access to criminal
documents, 57% of the district judges and 56% of the magistrate
judges responded that there should be unlimited remote public ac-
cess to non-sealed criminal case documents.55
46. Id.






53. GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 28, ¶ 1. R
54. DAVID RAUMA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REMOTE PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELEC-
TRONIC CRIMINAL CASE RECORDS:  A REPORT ON A PILOT PROJECT IN ELEVEN FED-
ERAL COURTS 4 (2003), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/remote
pa.pdf/$file/remotepa.pdf [hereinafter PILOT PROJECT].
55. Id. at 5.
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The results of the pilot program led the Conference to conclude
that the benefits of remote public electronic access to criminal case
files outweighed the potential risks of harm.56  In 2003, the Confer-
ence amended its policy to provide that criminal filings be made
available electronically to the same extent as at the courthouse,
with the requirement that personal identifiers be partially re-
dacted.57  Under the amended policy, criminal case filings are
treated in much the same way as civil documents; filers must redact
portions of certain personal information prior to filing.58  However,
due to security and law enforcement issues associated with criminal
cases, the Conference provided that certain documents, including
cooperation agreements, should not be included in the public case
file at all.59  These documents should thus be unavailable to the
public, both at the courthouse and via remote electronic access.60
The Conference further emphasized that courts maintain the dis-
cretion to seal any document or case file sua sponte.61
3. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1
The E-Government Act of 2002,62 enacted after the Conference
determined its initial policy on electronic access, requires that the
Supreme Court adopt rules “to protect privacy and security con-
cerns relating to [the] electronic filing of documents and the public
availability . . . of documents filed electronically.”63  In order to
56. GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 28, ¶ 2. R
57. See id. ¶ 5.
58. See id. ¶ 10 (“The policy adopted by the Conference in September 2003 states
in part:  Upon the effective date of any change in policy regarding remote public
access to electronic criminal case file documents, require that personal data identifiers
be redacted by the filer of the document, whether the document is filed electronically
or in paper, as follows:  1. Social Security numbers to the last four digits; 2. financial
account numbers to the last four digits; 3. names of minor children to the initials; 4.
dates of birth to the year; and 5. home addresses to city and state.”).
59. See id. ¶15 (noting that such documents include: unexecuted summonses or
warrants of any kind; pretrial bail or pre-sentence investigation reports; statements of
reasons in the judgment of conviction; juvenile records; documents containing identi-
fying information about jurors or potential jurors; financial affidavits filed in seeking
representation pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act; ex parte requests for authoriza-
tion of investigative, expert or other services pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act; and
sealed documents, such as motions for downward departure for substantial assistance
and plea agreements indicating cooperation).
60. See id.
61. See id. ¶ 19.  The GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 28, also states R
that if the court seals a document “after it has already been included in the public file,
the clerk shall remove the document from both the electronic and paper public files as
soon as the order sealing the document is entered.”
62. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002).
63. Id. § 205(c)(3)(A)(i).
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implement this privacy provision in the criminal context, the Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure drafted Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 49.1, which derived from the 2001 Report’s
“public is public” policy.64  The Rule became effective December 1,
2007.65 Entitled “Privacy Protection for Filings Made with the
Court,” the Rule contains, in pertinent part, the following
guidelines:
(A) REDACTED FILINGS.  Unless the court orders otherwise, in
an electronic or paper filing with the court that contains an
individual’s social-security number, taxpayer-identification
number, or birth date, the name of an individual known to
be a minor, a financial-account number, or the home ad-
dress of an individual, a party or nonparty making the filing
may include only:
(1) the last four digits of the social-security number and
taxpayer-identification number;
(2) the year of the individual’s birth;
(3) the minor’s initials;
(4) the last four digits of the financial-account number; and
(5) the city and state of the home address.
. . . .
(D) FILINGS MADE UNDER SEAL.  The court may order that a
filing be made under seal without redaction.  The court may
later unseal the filing or order the person who made the
filing to file a redacted version for the public record.
(E) PROTECTIVE ORDERS. For good cause, the court may by
order in a case:
(1) require redaction of additional information;66 or
(2) limit or prohibit a nonparty’s remote electronic access
to a document filed with the court.67
The Rule’s provisions for filing under seal and issuing protective
orders require the application of differing standards.  For example,
pursuant to subdivision (e),68 courts shall issue protective orders
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1 advisory committee’s note.
65. Id.  In its September 2007 report to the Judicial Conference, CACM noted that
some provisions of the Conference’s privacy policy are redundant or inconsistent with
provisions in the pending rules. Accordingly, CACM has directed its CM/ECF and
Privacy Implementation Subcommittee to formulate a recommendation to be made to
the Conference with regard to these policy provisions.
66. Id.  The Committee offers driver’s license numbers and alien registration num-
bers as examples of other “information not covered by the redaction requirement.”
67. Id.
68. Id. (“For good cause, the court may by order in a case . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
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only on a case-by-case basis.69  The Advisory Committee modeled
the “good cause” requirement of subdivision (e) on the “flexible”
standard for the issuance of protective orders set forth in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), which employs the phrase “[f]or
good cause shown.”70  Thus, the implementation of a local rule that
broadly prohibits a nonparty’s remote electronic access to certain
documents filed with the court would violate the Rule’s require-
ment for case-by-case determinations.  Such a local rule would be
invalidated under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57, which
requires that local rules be consistent with federal rules adopted
under 28 U.S.C. § 2072.71
Although subdivision (e) establishes a nationwide standard for
protective orders, subdivision (d) does not purport to do the same
for sealing court filings.  The rule-makers determined that the stan-
dard for sealing is well established by case law, and that the lack of
uniformity among the circuits would preclude the adoption of any
single standard in Rule 49.1(d).72  The Committee Note to Rule
49.1 explains that the requirement in subdivision (e) for case-by-
case determinations is not intended to affect the limitations on
sealing that are already applicable pursuant to circuit law.73  Thus,
if a particular circuit calls for sealing on a case-by-case basis, so too
does Rule 49.1(d).  However, circuits that permit across-the-board
sealing would not be in violation of the Rule; blanket sealing of
69. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AD-
MIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MINUTES OF THE APRIL 2006 MEETING 8, available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CR04-2006-min.pdf (“Professor Capra
noted that the phrase ‘in a case’ in subdivision [(e)] should be retained to make clear
that any protective orders of this nature must be issued on a case-by-case basis, not as
a standing order.”); see also FED. R. CRIM P. 49.1 advisory committee’s note at 154-55
(“It may also be necessary to protect information not covered by the redaction re-
quirement . . . in a particular case. In such cases, protection may be sought under
subdivision (d) or (e). . . . Subdivision (e) provides that the court can order in a partic-
ular case more extensive redaction than otherwise required by the Rule . . . .”) (em-
phasis added).
70. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE app. H, at 6 (2006) (on file with author).  The Committee shortened the
phrase to “cause shown” because this phrasing is used elsewhere in the Criminal
Rules.
71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57.
72. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra
note 70, app. H, at 6 (“The committee was satisfied with the explanation that the R
standard for sealing is well established, and there should be no effort to restate that
standard in Rule 49.1.”).
73. See FED. R. CRIM P. 49.1 advisory committee’s note at 155 (“Nothing in this
subdivision is intended to affect the limitations on sealing that are otherwise applica-
ble to the court.”).
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documents such as motions for downward departure for substantial
assistance and cooperation agreements may be accommodated
under the sealing provision of subdivision (d).74  As the Committee
Note reflects, sealed documents are not included in the case file,
and thus are inaccessible to the public, both at the courthouse and
via remote electronic access.75
4. Lingering Concerns of Nonparty Remote Electronic Access to
Criminal Case Filings
In November 2006, CACM and the Committee on Criminal Law
jointly issued a memorandum to district court judges alerting them
to the existence of whosarat.com, a website that identifies govern-
ment cooperators and undercover law enforcement officials in part
due to information that is publicly available on PACER.76  The
memorandum requested that judges “consider sealing documents
or hearing transcripts in accordance with applicable law in cases
that involve sensitive information or in cases in which incorrect in-
ferences may be made.”77
The Committee also sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice to solicit its view on how to address the issue.78  The Depart-
ment’s response reflected its concern that access to criminal case
filings via PACER has “dramatically increased the ability of any-
one, anywhere in this country or overseas, to identify, intimidate,
and stigmatize witnesses cooperating with federal law enforce-
ment.”79  In order to protect cooperating witnesses, undercover
agents and the secrecy of ongoing investigations, the Department
recommended three courses of action:  (1) remove all plea agree-
ments in criminal cases (including docket notations thereof) from
Internet access via PACER; (2) post notices on PACER and ECF
log-in screens warning against the republishing of official court
records for illicit purposes; and (3) restrict courtroom use of cellu-
lar telephones and other electronic devices capable of photograph-
74. See id. at 157.
75. See id. at 156.
76. Memorandum from John R. Tunheim, Chair, Comm. on Court Administra-
tion & Case Mgmt., and Paul Cassell Chair, Comm. on Criminal Law, to Judges, U.S.
Dist. Courts, and U.S. Magistrate Judges (Nov. 2006), available at http://
www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/summaries/briefs/06/06-2136/Filed_01-31-200




79. Letter from Michael A. Battle to John C. Duff, supra note 1. R
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ing, videotaping or recording parties or witnesses.80  The
Department’s proposal to remove docket notations for sealed plea
agreements sought to counteract the “red flag” effect:  although
sealing individual plea agreements may mask the document’s spe-
cific contents, the fact that PACER’s electronic docket reflects the
existence of a plea agreement threatens to compromise the physi-
cal security of cooperating defendants.81
From early September until late October 2007, CACM sought
public comment on the issues raised by the Department.82  The
Honorable John Tunheim of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Minnesota, who chairs CACM, stated that the committee will
consider the public comments closely in an effort to balance legiti-
mate security concerns with the need to allow public access to the
court system.83  According to Judge Tunheim, the “threats to coop-
erating defendants are real, and disclosure of cooperation agree-
ments can both affect a defendant’s personal security and affect a
willingness to continue to provide substantial assistance.  At the
same time, plea agreements are often the only record of how crimi-
nal cases are resolved.  The public surely has an interest in knowing
how criminal cases are resolved.”84
While CACM, its Privacy Subcommittee and the Judicial Confer-
ence consider the issue, the imminent dangers associated with
whosarat.com and similar websites persist.  Left unregulated, ac-
cess to sensitive documents could lead to a number of unfavorable
outcomes, including a decline in suspects’ cooperation with the
government due to fears of intimidation, retaliation and harass-
ment; a resulting increase in criminal trials that might otherwise
have been disposed of at the pleading stage; a simultaneous in-
crease in inaccurate verdicts due to potential witnesses’ refusal to
testify; and a jeopardizing of on-going investigations.
80. Id. at 2.
81. See id. at 3 (“For anyone with Internet access, a PACER account, and a basic
familiarity with the criminal docketing system, the notation of a sealed plea agree-
ment or docket entry in connection with a particular defendant is often a red flag that
the defendant is cooperating with the government.”).
82. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, New Privacy Rules Imminent, Another
Privacy Change Contemplated, THE THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 2007, http://www.uscourts
.gov/ttb/2007-11/new/index.html.
83. See id. ¶ 30-31.
84. Id. ¶ 32.
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B. The Rights of Access to Judicial Documents
A brief examination of the qualified rights of access to judicial
documents is necessary to evaluate proposed regulations on non-
party remote access to plea agreements.  Part I.B.1 of this Note
describes the origin and development of the common law right of
access to judicial documents.  Part I.B.2 discusses the contours of
the First Amendment right of access to judicial documents.
1. The Common Law Right of Access to Judicial Documents
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a common
law right85 of access to judicial documents in Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc.86  In that case, the Court found a general right to
inspect and copy judicial records and documents,87 and noted that
this right is not conditioned upon a proprietary interest in the doc-
ument, or upon a need for it as evidence.88  Rather, the common
law right is based on process-oriented interests such as “the citi-
zen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agen-
cies.”89  This right is not absolute.90  Courts may deny access where
court files may be used for “improper purposes.”91  For example,
the common law right of inspection is trumped when court records
are “‘used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal’
through the publication of ‘the painful and sometimes disgusting
details of a divorce case.’”92 Further, courts may properly refuse to
permit case filings “to serve as reservoirs of libelous statements for
85. The Supreme Court in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589
(1978), did not constitutionalize the right of access to court documents. Nixon was
decided before the Court established the qualified First Amendment right to attend
criminal proceedings in the Richmond Newspapers line of cases. See infra note 132 R
and accompanying text. Nixon involved
a claim for physical access to tape recordings when ‘[t]he contents of the
tapes were given wide publicity by all elements of the media’ and there was
‘no question of a truncated flow of information to the public.’ . . . Nixon has,
therefore, not impeded the circuits in their efforts to derive historical sup-
port for the public availability of certain judicial documents in the American
common law heritage.
Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
86. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597 (1978).





92. Id. (quoting In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893)).
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press consumption, or as sources of business information that
might harm a litigant’s competitive standing . . . .”93
Relying upon the Nixon decision, the Second Circuit has also
recognized a common law right of access to court documents.  The
court in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga noted that this right
is “firmly rooted in our nation’s history,”94 and is based on the
need for federal courts
to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have
confidence in the administration of justice. . . . Although courts
have a number of internal checks, . . . professional and public
monitoring is an essential feature of democratic control.  Moni-
toring both provides judges with critical views of their work and
deters arbitrary judicial behavior.  Without monitoring, moreo-
ver, the public could have no confidence in the conscientious-
ness, reasonableness, or honesty of judicial proceedings.  Such
monitoring is not possible without access to testimony and docu-
ments that are used in the performance of Article III
functions.95
The common law right of access to judicial proceedings and doc-
uments creates a presumption in favor of public access to, and
against the sealing of, judicial documents.96  However, this pre-
sumption may be outweighed by countervailing interests,97 and is
susceptible to displacement by statute.98
The Second Circuit requires that trial courts undertake a three-
pronged inquiry in order to determine whether a common law right
of access attaches to a submitted document.99  First, the court must
determine that the document at issue qualifies as a “judicial docu-
ment.”100  Although the circuits apply varying standards in deter-
mining what qualifies as a judicial document,101 the Second Circuit
has held that the mere filing of a document, without more, does not
93. Id. at 598 (internal citations omitted).
94. 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006).
95. Id. (quoting United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo II), 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
96. United States v. Sattar, 471 F. Supp. 2d 380, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
97. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120.
98. N.Y. Times Co. v. Biaggi, 828 F.2d 110, 115 (2d Cir. 1987).
99. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050-51; see also Sattar, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 384.
100. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119.
101. For example, the Third Circuit focuses on the technical question of whether
the document is physically on file with the court.  If the document is not filed, it is not
a judicial record. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 782 (3d Cir.
1994); see also Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161-62
(3d Cir. 1993); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs.,
800 F.2d 339, 344-45 (3d Cir. 1986).
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subject that document to the right of public access.  Instead, the
item filed “must be relevant to the performance of the judicial
function and useful in the judicial process in order for it to be des-
ignated a judicial document.”102  Whether the court actually relies
on the document is not dispositive.103  Rather, “[i]t is sufficient that
the document was submitted to the Court for purposes of seeking
or opposing an adjudication.”104  The Second Circuit defines “‘ad-
judication’ as a ‘formal act of government, the basis of which
should, absent exceptional circumstances, be subject to public
scrutiny.’”105
Once the court has designated the document at issue a judicial
document to which the common law presumption of access there-
fore attaches,106 the court must then determine the weight to which
that presumption is entitled.  The presumption’s weight is governed
by a context-specific consideration107 of the “role of the material at
issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant
value of such information to those monitoring the federal
courts.”108  The information generally falls somewhere on a spec-
trum from matters that directly affect an adjudication, to matters
that “come within a court’s purview solely to insure their
irrelevance.”109
102. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119 (quoting United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo I), 44
F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995)).
103. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 122 (“‘[R]elevant documents which are submitted to, and
accepted by, a court of competent jurisdiction in the course of adjudicatory proceed-
ings, become documents to which the right of access applies,’ a framing that has noth-
ing to do with how a court ultimately comes out on a motion.” (quoting Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987))).
104. Sattar, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 385; see also United States v. Milken, No. (S)89Cr.41,
1990 WL 263532, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1990) (“The rationale for giving public ac-
cess to motion papers, including letters that request judicial action, is that the public
should be able to observe the process of adjudication, including knowing what mate-
rial the parties bring to the court’s attention to influence judicial action.  I think that
rationale argues for giving the public access to more than letters that specifically re-
quest judicial action.  For example, a judge may be interested in moving a case along
quickly toward trial, and the parties, in an effort to explain why that does not make
sense in a particular case, may bring to the court’s attention certain matters in letters
that do not specifically seek judicial action, but the material in those letters may influ-
ence the court’s action.”).
105. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880,
893 (2d Cir. 1982)).
106. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119.
107. United States v. Graham, 257 F.3d 143, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001).
108. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049.
109. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119 (quoting Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049).
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This spectrum of weight is marked by four general guideposts.
Where the document at issue is introduced at trial,110 is material to
a court’s disposition of a case on the merits,111 or plays a significant
role in determining a litigant’s substantive rights—conduct at the
heart of the Article III function112—the document is accorded the
strongest presumption of access.113  This calculation is not affected
by judicial reliance upon the submitted document; the presumption
is entitled to great weight so long as a party submits the document
to the court for the purposes of adjudication.114  As the Lugosch
court explained, if the rationale behind access is to allow for trans-
parency of the judicial process, then documents that the judge
failed to consider or rely upon are just as deserving of disclosure as
those documents that actually entered into the court’s decision.115
A document that plays a lesser role in the Article III function
falls in the middle of the spectrum.116  Here the determination of
weight can be informed in part by tradition:  where documents are
usually filed with the court and are generally available, the weight
of the presumption is stronger than where filing is unusual or gen-
erally under seal.117  Where the document has a negligible role in
the performance of the court’s Article III duties, the weight of the
resulting presumption is low and “amounts to little more than a
prediction of public access absent a countervailing reason.”118  Fi-
nally, a document that plays no role in the performance of Article
III functions, such as a paper passed between parties during discov-
ery, lies entirely beyond the presumption’s reach.119
After resolving the weight of the presumption of access, courts
must then “balance competing considerations against it.”120  The
Second Circuit has noted that such countervailing factors “include
but are not limited to ‘the danger of impairing law enforcement or
judicial efficiency’ and ‘the privacy interests of those resisting dis-
110. Graham, 257 F.3d at 151; see also Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 952
(2d Cir. 1980).
111. Graham, 257 F.3d at 151; see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir.
1982).
112. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049.
113. Id; see also Joy, 692 F.2d at 894; United States v. Sattar, 471 F. Supp. 2d 380,
385 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
114. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 123; see also Sattar, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 386.
115. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 123.
116. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049-50.
117. Id. at 1050.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (quoting Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050).
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closure.’”121  In Amodeo I, the court stated that this “law enforce-
ment privilege” is designed
to prevent disclosure of law enforcement techniques and proce-
dures, to preserve the confidentiality of sources, to protect wit-
ness and law enforcement personnel, to safeguard the privacy of
individuals involved in an investigation, and otherwise to pre-
vent interference with an investigation.122
Unlimited access might adversely affect law enforcement inter-
ests or judicial performance by creating a disincentive to coopera-
tion for persons who desire confidentiality.123  If access to judicial
documents is likely to cause persons “to resist involvement where
cooperation is desirable, that effect should be weighed against the
presumption . . . .”124
Additionally, the privacy interests of innocent third parties re-
sisting disclosure “should weigh heavily in a court’s balancing
equation.”125  Courts “have long declined to allow public access
simply to cater ‘to a morbid craving for that which is sensational
and impure.’”126  In determining the weight to be accorded an as-
sertion of a right of privacy, courts should first consider the degree
to which the subject matter is traditionally considered private
rather than public.127  Documents “relating to family affairs, ill-
nesses, embarrassing conduct with no public ramifications, and
similar matters, weigh more heavily against access than conduct af-
fecting a substantial portion of the public.”128  Second, courts must
weigh the potential nature and degree of injury resulting from a
judicial grant of access.129  Commercial competitors seeking an ad-
vantage over rivals “need not be indulged in the name of monitor-
ing the courts, and personal vendettas similarly need not be
aided.”130  Courts may consider whether “the nature of the materi-
als is such that there is a fair opportunity for the subject to respond
to any accusations contained therein.”131
121. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120.
122. Amodeo I, 44 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Dep’t of Investigation of
N.Y. v. Myerson, 856 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1988)).
123. See Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Gardner v. Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1990)).
126. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051 (quoting In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893)).





\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ507.txt unknown Seq: 20  4-NOV-08 14:20
1282 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
2. The Constitutional Right of Access to Judicial Documents
While the United States Supreme Court has, since 1980, recog-
nized a First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings,132
the lower federal courts have extended the constitutional access
doctrine to judicial documents.  In determining whether the First
Amendment requires access to certain proceedings, the Court ar-
ticulated a “history and logic” test:133  under the history prong, the
Court considers whether “the place and process have historically
been open to the press and general public,” while under the logic
prong, the Court considers whether “public access plays a signifi-
cant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question.”134  The lower courts have applied this two-pronged test
to the judicial documents context.  Although the Second Circuit
employs two approaches in discerning whether a constitutional
right of access attaches to a particular document filed with the
court, both inquiries are founded upon the Supreme Court’s his-
tory and logic calculus.135
Under the first approach, the Second Circuit applies the experi-
ence and logic test to the particular judicial document at issue.  In
order to discern a tradition of access to court records in satisfaction
of the “history” prong, the Second Circuit invokes the common law
right of access to judicial documents recognized in Nixon.136  If the
judicial document at issue has “historically been open to the press
and general public,” courts must then consider whether “public ac-
cess plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the partic-
ular process in question.”137  Should both prongs of this experience
and logic test be satisfied, a qualified First Amendment right of
access to the document attaches.138
132. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986);
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
133. Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 27 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
589).
134. Id. at 8.
135. See, e.g., Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004).
136. Id. at 92-93.
137. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (quot-
ing Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 8).
138. See, e.g., Hartford Courant, 380 F.3d at 93.  In this case, the court examined the
common law tradition and concluded that docket sheets satisfied the history prong:
Early English usage confirmed the openness of the docket books, which
were maintained by the clerks, and, although different in form from the
docket sheets at issue here, covered similar matters. . . .  Our national heri-
tage is not inconsistent.  Since the first years of the Republic, state statutes
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The Second Circuit also applies a variation of that line of reason-
ing to determine whether a constitutional right of access attaches
to court filings.  Under this approach, courts consider “the extent
to which the judicial documents are ‘derived from or [are] a neces-
sary corollary of the capacity to attend the relevant proceed-
ings.’”139  In explaining the rationale for this proceeding-centric
test, the Hartford Courant v. Pellegrino court explained that it
“would be an odd result indeed were we to declare that our court-
rooms must be open, but that transcripts of the proceedings occur-
ring there may be closed, for what exists of the right of access if it
extends only to those who can squeeze through the door?”140
Under this approach, courts apply the experience and logic test to
the proceeding in order to discern whether there is a constitutional
right of access to a document filed pursuant to that proceeding.141
For example, in United States v. Haller, the court found a First
Amendment right of access to plea agreements by applying the
Press-Enterprise II test to the plea hearing itself.142  The Haller
court determined that both the experience and logic prongs were
satisfied, since “[p]lea hearings have typically been open to the
public, and such access, as in the case of criminal trials, . . . serves
to allow public scrutiny of the conduct of courts and prosecu-
tors.”143  Accordingly, a qualified First Amendment right of access
covers not only plea hearings, but also documents filed in connec-
tion with those hearings.144  Under this approach, then, the consti-
have mandated that clerks maintain records of judicial proceedings in the
form of docket books, which were presumed open either by common law or
in accordance with particular legislation. . . . History therefore demonstrates
that docket sheets and their equivalents were, in general, expected to remain
open for public viewing and copying.
Id. at 94-95 (citation omitted).
Further, “[l]ogic supports this judgment of history,” since, in the case of docket
sheets, openness “enhances both . . . basic fairness . . . and the appearance of fairness
so essential to public confidence in the system.” Id. at 95 (citations omitted).  Moreo-
ver, the court embraced the Richmond Newspapers Court’s notion of the educative
value of openness, stating that “docket sheets furnish an ‘opportunity both for under-
standing the system in general and its workings in a particular case.’” Id. at 95 (quot-
ing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572).  Thus, the court concluded that docket
sheets are presumptively open, and that the public and press have a qualified First
Amendment right to inspect them.
139. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Press-Enter. II, 478 U.S. at 8).
140. Hartford Courant, 380 F.3d at 93 (quoting United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d
1348, 1360 (3d Cir. 1994)).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1988).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 87; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Biaggi, 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987).
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tutional right to inspect documents “derives from the public nature
of the particular tribunals.”145
Regardless of which test courts adopt to determine whether a
constitutional right of access attaches to a particular document,
such a right is not absolute.146  Courts may order documents sealed
“if specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that
closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest.”147  Judges may even enter their find-
ings under seal, if appropriate.148  However, continued sealing of
judicial documents may be justified only if the “higher values”
framework so demands.149  Because the public cannot monitor the
judicial process “with long delays based on secret documents,”
courts must “make [their] findings quickly.”150 The Lugosch court
emphasized “the importance of immediate access where a right to
access is found,”151 since any delay “may have the same result as
complete suppression.”152
In addition to applying heightened scrutiny to a party’s motion
to seal, the court must provide appropriate public notice prior to
granting such a motion.153  For example, a motion for courtroom
closure154 or for sealing documents155 should be listed in the public
docket files maintained by the clerk of the court.156  While the mo-
tion itself may be filed under seal,
the publicly maintained docket entries should reflect the fact
that the motion was filed, the fact that the motion and any sup-
porting or opposing papers were filed under seal, the time and
145. Hartford Courant, 380 F.3d at 93.
146. See, e.g., Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir.
2006).
147. Id. at 120 (quoting Biaggi, 828 F.2d at 116).
148. Biaggi, 828 F.2d at 116.
149. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124.
150. Id. at 126-27.
151. Id. at 126.
152. Id. (quoting Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897
(7th Cir. 1994)).
153. See United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We rea-
soned in Herald that ‘[s]ince by its nature the right of public access is shared broadly
by those not parties to the litigation, vindication of that right requires some meaning-
ful opportunity for protest by persons other than the initial litigants, some or all of
whom may prefer closure.’ . . . We said that ‘it seems entirely inadequate to leave the
vindication of a First Amendment right to the fortuitous presence in the courtroom of
a public spirited citizen willing to complain about closure’ . . . .” (quoting Herald Co.
v. Klepfer, 734 F.2d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 1984))).
154. Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 200.
155. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004).
156. Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 200.
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place of any hearing on the motion, the occurrence of such hear-
ing, the disposition of the motion, and the fact of courtroom clo-
sure, whether ordered upon motion of a party or by the Court
sua sponte.  Entries on the docket should be made promptly,
normally on the day the pertinent event occurs . . . . We think
this type of general public notice suffices to afford an adequate
opportunity for challenge to courtroom closure.157
However, there may be “extraordinary situations” in which
docket notation could place an individual at risk.158  For example, a
closure order docketed prior to the start of a multi-defendant trial
might indicate that a defendant had been granted immunity in ex-
change for testimony.159  This inference of cooperation could en-
danger the witness-defendant if the basis for the inference were to
be disclosed prior to his testifying.160  Under such circumstances,
docketing may be delayed161 “for some brief interval, provided that
the interval ends upon a specified date or the occurrence, within a
reasonable time, of a specified event and that the judge’s reasons
for delaying docketing . . . are set forth, under seal if appropriate,
for eventual appellate scrutiny.”162  Moreover, trial courts have dis-
cretion to undertake additional measures to protect privacy inter-
ests. In an “extraordinary situation,” such as when an individual
might be at risk from public docketing, courts may permit the gov-
ernment time to notify the parties involved, or entertain motions to
maintain those specific docket sheets under seal.163  The Second
Circuit emphasized that these examples “are not an exhaustive list
of the methods that the district court might consider employing to
protect any implicated privacy interests.”164
II. COMPETING APPROACHES TO THE CHALLENGES PRESENTED
BY PACER
Part II outlines the options available to courts within the Second
Circuit that may mitigate the issues created by nonparty remote
electronic access.  Part II.A discusses the Public is Public approach,
in which the medium of access is irrelevant to the question of
157. Id. (quoting Klepfer, 734 F.2d at 102-03).
158. Klepfer, 734 F.2d at 103 n.7; see also United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87
(2d Cir. 1988).
159. Klepfer, 734 F.2d at 103 n.7.
160. Id.
161. Haller, 837 F.2d at 87.
162. Klepfer, 734 F.2d at 103 n.7.
163. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2004).
164. Id. at 99.
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whether a particular document is publicly available.  This approach
utilizes sealing to restrict both traditional and remote electronic ac-
cess to case filings.  Second Circuit case law, which requires docket
notation for sealed filings, renders the Public is Public approach an
unattractive solution for courts in that circuit.  Part II.B describes
the Medium-Based approach, whereby the public availability of
sensitive court filings varies depending on the medium through
which access is sought.  The practical and legal deficiencies of this
model may counsel against its adoption.  Finally, Part II.C de-
scribes the Exclusion approach, whereby certain sensitive docu-
ments are not filed with the court at all.  The Exclusion approach is
not only efficient, but also consistent with the access doctrine and
other federal guidelines, and should be implemented by courts in
the Second Circuit.
A. Public Is Public:  Extend the Presumption of Access to the
Digital Domain
Under the Public is Public approach, plea agreements would be
remotely available to nonparties to the same extent that such fil-
ings are publicly available at the courthouse.  As of October 2007,
sixty-five U.S. district courts (71.4%) utilize this policy.165 Advo-
cates of this position base their arguments in the justifications for
the qualified rights of access to judicial records under the First
Amendment and the common law:  openness enhances both the
basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so
essential to public confidence in the system;166 undue restrictions
on electronically stored filings, as well as broad categorical prohibi-
tions on access, undermine these fundamental goals.167  These pro-
165. . The Author has performed a survey of the electronic access policies of the
U.S. district courts.  The aforementioned group of sixty-five includes: M.D. Ala., N.D.
Ala., S.D. Ala., D. Alaska, D. Ariz., W.D. Ark., C.D. Cal., E.D. Cal., D. Colo., D.
Conn., D. Del., D.D.C., M.D. Fla., N.D. Fla., N.D. Ga., S.D. Ga., D. Haw., D. Idaho,
N.D. Ill., S.D. Ill., N.D. Ind., N.D. Iowa, S.D. Iowa, D. Kan., E.D. Ky., W.D. Ky.,
W.D. La., D. Me., D. Mass., W.D. Mich., W.D. Mo., D. Mont., D. Neb., D. Nev.,
D.N.H., D.N.J., D.N.M., W.D.N.Y., M.D.N.C., W.D.N.C., N.D. Ohio, S.D. Ohio, E.D.
Okla., N.D. Okla., W.D. Okla., D. Or., M.D. Pa., W.D. Pa., D.P.R., D.R.I., D.S.C.,
E.D. Tenn., M.D. Tenn., N.D. Tex., S.D. Tex., D. Utah, D. Vt., E.D. Va., W.D. Va.,
E.D. Wash., W.D. Wash., N.D. W. Va., S.D. W. Va., E.D. Wis., W.D. Wis. David Sny-
der, Survey of the Electronic Access Policies of the U.S. District Courts (2007), Ap-
pendix of this Note, tbl.1.
166. See Press-Enter. I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978); see also Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d
110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006); Amodeo II, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995).
167. See, e.g., James M. Chadwick, Access to Electronic Court Records 2-3 (June
2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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cess-oriented concerns remain relevant in the electronic context,
and advocates of the Public is Public approach contend that the
medium of file storage and access should not alter the long-recog-
nized presumption of access.168  Moreover, as courts complete the
transition to electronic filing, rules governing remote access will
become the rules governing access to all court records.169 Accord-
ingly, courts should not impose restrictions on remote electronic
access that are inconsistent with the traditional doctrine of access
to paper records.170  Finally, proponents of the Public is Public view
claim that restricting remote access represents an incomplete solu-
tion, because sensitive filings, unless sealed, would remain availa-
ble to the public at the clerk’s office, and could still be digitally
converted and disseminated.171  This could lead to the creation of a
“cottage industry” that profits through the sale of public
information.172
Advocates of the Public is Public position would commence their
analysis by considering whether a First Amendment right of access
attaches to the particular document in question.  As discussed, the
Second Circuit has employed various lines of reasoning in response
to this inquiry: courts may apply the history and logic formula to
the document at issue; they may apply the same formula to the
relevant proceeding to determine whether a qualified right of ac-
cess attaches to a document filed pursuant thereto; or they may
apply both iterations concurrently.173  For example, because a qual-
ified right of access attaches to plea agreements,174 proponents of
the Public is Public approach would argue that this right carries
over into the electronic realm.
The Public is Public approach acknowledges that the constitu-
tional and common law rights of access are not absolute.  However,
rather than providing for restrictions depending upon the medium
employed to secure access, this approach posits that traditional
measures for protecting privacy and security remain adequate in
the electronic realm.  For example, pursuant to Federal Rule of
168. See, e.g., DEYLING, supra note 11, at 6.
169. See, e.g., Chadwick, supra note 167, at 9. R
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, FALL 2007 REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON PRIVACY AND SECURITY IMPLI-
CATIONS OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO CERTAIN ELECTRONIC CRIMINAL CASE FILE DOCU-
MENTS, http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/requestcomment.htm.
172. See, e.g., 2001 REPORT, supra note 41. R
173. See, e.g., United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir.1988).
174. Id. at 86-87.
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Criminal Procedure 49.1(e)(1), courts may, on a case-by-case basis,
require the additional redaction of filings.175  Moreover, courts may
seal filings under subdivision (d), which defers to circuit law on
whether case-by-case determinations are required.176  Because the
Second Circuit requires that courts make case-by-case determina-
tions on motions to seal,177 a local rule authorizing the sealing of all
plea agreements is impermissible.  Following a court’s case-specific
determination that a particular document warrants sealing, that
document would be inaccessible to the public—both at the court-
house and on PACER.  Absent “extraordinary situations” necessi-
tating temporary delay, the existence of the sealed document must
be notated in the docket.178
B. The Medium-Based Approach:  Restrict Nonparties’ Remote
Electronic Access
1. Background
The Medium-Based approach provides that courts should restrict
nonparty remote access to certain court filings in order to protect
against potential threats to cooperators’ security and privacy.
Under this approach, judges and court staff would presumably
have unlimited remote access to all electronic case files.179  Similar
access might be extended to other participants in the judicial pro-
cess, such as Assistant United States Attorneys.180  Litigants and
their attorneys would have unrestricted access to court filings rele-
vant to their own cases, while the public would have remote access
only to a subset of the case file.181  However, the complete elec-
tronic case file would remain available for public review at the
courthouse.182
As a threshold matter, proponents of the Medium-Based posi-
tion may contend that remote access restrictions do not implicate
the constitutional or common law access doctrines.  While this
model acknowledges the qualified rights of access to court filings, it
may emphasize that there is no right to electronic access.  In other
175. FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1.
176. Id.
177. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006).
178. United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 200 (2d Cir. 2005); Herald Co. v.
Klepfer, 734 F.2d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 1984).
179. See Robert Deyling, Privacy and Access to Electronic Case Files in the Federal
Courts 10 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
180. Id.
181. Id.  The subset would include pleadings, briefs, orders and opinions.
182. Id.
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words, the Medium-Based approach provides for restrictions on
electronic access, but does not displace the qualified right of access.
Because the Medium-Based model contemplates restricting remote
access, rather than sealing or closure, its advocates may contend
that their approach circumvents both strict scrutiny and Nixon’s
common law balancing test.
However, assuming, arguendo, that restrictions on electronic ac-
cess do implicate the access doctrine, proponents of the Medium-
Based approach may maintain that the rationale supporting disclo-
sure does not necessarily apply in the electronic context.  Whereas
the Public is Public approach assumes that the technological inno-
vation of PACER does not affect the qualified rights of access to
court filings, the Medium-Based approach assumes the opposite:
the electronic accessibility of data raises different privacy risks than
the traditional mode of access to court filings.  For example, some
commentators emphasize that electronic accessibility of sensitive
filings implicates security and privacy interests not only in the short
term, but also in the distant future.183 Under this view, the demise
of practical obscurity fundamentally alters the manner in which
courts should analyze issues of access; adhering to the Public is
Public model would “eviscerate years of careful judicial labor in
which courts struggled to achieve an appropriate balance between
the competing goals of public access and privacy.”184
The proposition that electronic storage of data may affect the
access analysis is based on the Reporters Committee decision, in
which the Supreme Court denied the press’ Freedom of Informa-
tion Act request to gain access to computerized FBI rap sheets.185
The Court found that even if certain information is not wholly pri-
183. See, e.g., Winn, supra note 13, at 317 (noting that, because electronic records R
are inorganic and do not succumb to deterioration, a “serious question arises as to
whether a rehabilitated criminal will be allowed to put his past behind him, whether a
former prostitute who was acquitted of a murder charge will ever be allowed to forget
it, or whether a victim of a sexual assault will be allowed to heal her wounds and not
be victimized once again by reminder and new public disclosure many years later”);
see also id. at 328-29 (“The world of cyber-justice should not be permitted to degener-
ate into a world where victims of crimes are reluctant to come forward; where people
are more unwilling to be witnesses or jurors; and where the rich can seek out private
judicial forums to resolve their disputes, while the poor and middle classes are faced
with an impossible choice—either foregoing justice to maintain their privacy and se-
curity; or permitting their sensitive personal information to be commercialized or sto-
len, and allowing the intimate details of their personal lives to be made available all
over the Internet.”).
184. Id. at 327.
185. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 780 (1989).
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vate, “a strong privacy interest inheres in the nondisclosure of com-
piled computerized information.”186  Where the subject of a rap
sheet is a private citizen and the information is in the government’s
control as a compilation, rather than as a process-oriented record
of “what the Government is up to,” the individual’s privacy interest
is at its apex.187
Advocates of the Medium-Based position may embrace the Re-
porters Committee decision as signaling that any qualified right of
access to paper filings does not automatically extend to the elec-
tronic medium.  Rather, public access to digital filings requires an
alternative balancing analysis, in which the modes of access and file
storage are highly relevant to whether a document should be re-
motely accessible.  The Medium-Based approach thus may call for
a modification of the traditional presumption of access in the digi-
tal realm,188 and asks that courts consider other factors in the bal-
ancing analysis, such as whether indiscriminate access (i) conflicts
with the administration of justice; (ii) unnecessarily causes inva-
sions of privacy; or (iii) exposes litigants, witnesses, and other inno-
cent third parties to threats from the potential misuse of their
information.189
Proponents of the Medium-Based view also may note that re-
strictions on nonparties’ remote access to case filings are consistent
with the general access jurisprudence.  For example, the Richmond
Newspapers line of cases based the presumptive openness of crimi-
nal proceedings on a concern for transparency of process.190
Courts sought to discourage decisions based on bias or partiality,
which would inspire public confidence in both the “methods of
government” and judicial remedies.191  The Second Circuit’s ac-
cess-to-documents jurisprudence is based on the same concerns.192
In sum, the rationale for openness is founded not in the public’s
186. Id. at 766.  The Court determined that the privacy interest at issue was magni-
fied due to the electronic nature of the information:  “[t]he substantial character of
that interest is affected by the fact that in today’s society the computer can accumu-
late and store information that would otherwise have surely been forgotten long
before a person attains age 80, when the FBI’s rap sheets are discarded.” Id. at 771.
187. Id. at 780.
188. See Winn, supra note 13, at 328. R
189. See id.
190. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556 (1980).
191. Id. at 572.  Further, the presumption of access to criminal proceedings was
principally rooted in the desire “to keep a watchful eye” on governmental operations.
See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
192. See, e.g., Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 95 (2d Cir. 2004).
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desire to “gratify private spite or promote public scandal,”193 but
instead in satisfying process-oriented interests.194  Proponents of
the Medium-Based approach may contend that remote access re-
strictions do not violate these core interests.  Because non-sealed
court filings would remain accessible in electronic and paper form
at the courthouse, remote restrictions would not seriously disrupt
the public’s ability to satisfy its process-oriented interests in disclo-
sure.  Members of the public who lack geographic proximity to the
courthouse may be disadvantaged, but the qualified rights sound in
access, not in electronic access.  Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 49.1(e)(2), which permits courts, upon a showing of good
cause, to limit or prohibit a nonparty’s remote electronic access to
filed documents, confirms the viability of the Medium-Based posi-
tion, so long as the restriction is applied on a case-by-case basis.195
2. Recent Applications of the Medium-Based Approach
As of October 2007, sixteen U.S. district courts (17.6%) bar non-
party remote access to plea agreements, but permit access to such
documents at the courthouse.196  For example, in response to
whosarat.com, the judges of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania unanimously197 agreed to adopt this policy
in the form of a protocol198 effective September 1, 2007.199  Pursu-
ant to the protocol, all plea-related filings, such as plea agreements
and other memoranda, shall be designated on the court’s electronic
docket as “Plea Documents.”200  Similarly, all sentencing-related
filings shall be designated “Sentencing Documents,” while judicial
orders shall be designated “Judicial Documents.”201  The public
may view these labels through CM/ECF, but only approved users
193. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (quoting In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893)).
194. The U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the public’s interest in disclosure is to
“shed light on the conduct of . . . Government agenc[ies] or official[s].” See U.S. Dep’t
of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)).
195. FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1.
196. Snyder, supra note 165. This group of sixteen includes the following districts: R
E.D. Ark., S.D. Cal., S.D. Fla., M.D. Ga., C.D. Ill., E.D. La., M.D. La., D. Md., E.D.
Mich., Minn. D., E.D. Mo., E.D. Pa., D.S.D., W.D. Tenn., E.D. Tex., W.D. Tex.
197. Associated Press, Courts Keeping Records off Net to Shield Informants, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER, July 24, 2007, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx
?id=18837.
198. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF PA., NOTICE:  CRIMINAL CASES PRO-
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may access the underlying documents.202  Nonparty electronic data
miners are thus unable to determine the identities of cooperators
or undercover law enforcement personnel.203  Moreover, because
the protocol’s labeling practice does not permit notification on the
electronic docket of the existence of sealed filings, nonparties are
prevented from deducing which plea and sentencing documents
contain sensitive information.204  Members of the public may none-
theless examine at the courthouse non-sealed filings covered by the
protocol.205  The Honorable Harvey Bartle III, Chief Judge of the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, em-
phasized that “[w]e’re not going to have secret documents.  [Non-
sealed filings] will still be available for anybody that wants to walk
into the courthouse office and get [them].”206
Underlying the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s protocol are
concerns for the security of current cooperators, as well as for
counterbalancing disincentives to future cooperation.207  The
judges of that district found an “immediate need to address
problems engendered” by whosarat.com,208 preferring not to wait
for the occurrence of a tragedy before taking action.209  Because
the public may access non-sealed plea agreements at the court-
house, the protocol cannot guarantee witness safety.  As Judge
Bartle acknowledged, “[o]ur protocol does not solve entirely the
whosarat website problem.  However, [the protocol] does make it
more difficult for the malefactors to achieve their objective of in-
timidation.”210  Judge Bartle emphasized that the Eastern District’s
protocol is designed as a first line of defense against nonparty data
202. Id. (“Passwords will be provided to all appropriate parties such as judges, law
clerks, the Government, specific defense counsel involved in the filing, Probation, and
where necessary, personnel at the Court of Appeals, so as to provide electronic access
to all documents, not under seal and related to pleas and sentencing and orders re-
lated to those documents.”); see also Shannon P. Duffy, PA Courts Move to Protect
Informants from ‘Who’s a Rat?’ Web Site, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jul. 17, 2007, http://
www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1184576795741.
203. Duffy, supra note 202. R
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Associated Press, supra note 197.
207. See, e.g., PROTOCOL, supra note 198 (“There is an immediate need to address R
problems engendered by an Internet website which uses publicly available informa-
tion to identify and publicize individuals suspected of cooperating with law enforce-
ment agents appearing on the docket as accessed through the court’s CM/ECF
system.”).
208. Id.
209. See Duffy, supra note 202. R
210. Letter from Harvey Bartle III, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of
Pa., to John R. Tunheim, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Minn. (Oct. 5, 2007)
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mining:211  “If it saves one life, it’s worth it, in my view . . . .”212
According to Judge Anita B. Brody, the protocol preserves the
public’s qualified rights of access to judicial documents, but simul-
taneously serves as an impediment to the data collection efforts of
sites like whosarat.com.213
In November 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida issued a similar directive,214 making plea agree-
ments inaccessible to nonparties via remote electronic access.215  In
order to implement the directive, the court created a code for use
in docketing plea agreements in CM/ECF that allows remote ac-
cess to internal court users and parties to a case, but restricts re-
mote access to all other persons.216 Interested nonparties who
attempt to access a plea agreement electronically receive a prompt
that states “[y]ou do not have permission to view this docu-
ment.”217  The CM/ECF system does not inform nonparties that
unsealed plea agreements are available for public access at the
courthouse.218  However, such conventional methods of access re-
main available for interested nonparties.219
The Southern District of Florida only intends this procedure as a
“short-term measure”220 designed to protect current and future co-
operating witnesses.  Former Chief Judge William Zloch, who over-
saw the implementation of the procedure, noted that the
prohibition on nonparty remote access to plea agreements “[h]as
been requested by the defense bar.  The defense wants to keep
[plea agreements] private.  They even request such files be
sealed. . . . The lawyers say, ‘It puts my client at risk.’”221  Accord-
[hereinafter Privacy Policy Comments], available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/
attachments/comment%20EDPA%20district.pdf.
211. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 202 (Chief Judge Bartle noted that “[t]hose docu- R
ments will still be publicly available in the courthouse for anyone who wants to come
here and see them—provided they are not under seal—but you will not be able to sit
back in your armchair and gain access to them”).
212. Lounsberry, supra note 6; see also Privacy Policy Comments, supra note 210. R
213. Duffy, supra note 202. R
214. Memorandum, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Fla., Processing of Plea




217. Julie Kay, Defense Bar Protests Removal of Plea Deals from U.S. Web Site,
PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Apr. 23, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArti-
cleFriendly.jsp?id=1177331772003.
218. Fla. Memorandum, supra note 214. R
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Kay, supra note 217. R
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ507.txt unknown Seq: 32  4-NOV-08 14:20
1294 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
ing to Judge Zloch, the directive represents a balance between the
interests in public access and witness security.  “We didn’t want to
pull [plea agreements] all off [CM/ECF] and seal them,” he noted,
“and yet we wanted to somehow help the lawyers who were re-
questing it and said, ‘If you want to look at them, you have to go
down to the courthouse.’”222  Plea agreements are “not being kept
from the public,” the Judge emphasized, “[they] are just no longer
available online.”223  As of September 2007, the Southern District
of Florida has not announced any new action.  However, Chief
Judge Federico Moreno, who succeeded Judge Zloch in July 2007,
suggested that the policy might change.  “We make a bigger deal
out of things than they deserve sometimes,” he explained.  “Most
people next door, at the jail, already know about these things.
Close to half the criminal cases, if not more, involve plea deals.”224
C. The Exclusion Approach:  Exclude Plea Agreements from
the Public Record
Under the Exclusion approach, plea agreements would be
treated as government exhibits, and would not be filed with the
court.  As of October 2007, three U.S. district courts (3.3%) utilize
this policy.225  For example, Local Civil Rule 39.1 of the Southern
District of New York, entitled “Custody of Exhibits,” applies to
criminal proceedings pursuant to Local Criminal Rule 1.1(b), and
provides that exhibits shall not be filed with the court, but shall be
retained by the respective attorneys who produced them in court,
unless the court orders otherwise.226  Plea agreements in the South-
ern District are marked as government exhibits; rather than being
filed, they are delivered to the Court during the plea and returned
to the government at the conclusion of the proceeding.227  If neces-
sary, the proceeding may be closed and the transcript sealed to
protect the contents of the plea agreement.  On appeal, the govern-
ment must deliver the plea agreements to the circuit court upon
222. Emma Schwartz, Judiciary May Pull Plea Filings from Web, LEGAL TIMES,
May 21, 2007, at 8.
223. Kay, supra note 217. R
224. Julie Kay, New Chief Judge Promises More Openness, Technology, PALM
BEACH DAILY BUS. REV. July 16, 2007, at 1.
225. Snyder, Survey, supra note 165.  These districts include: S.D.N.Y., E.D.N.Y., R
N.D.N.Y.
226. See U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., LOCAL RULES OF THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF
NEW YORK, http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/rules.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
227. Telephone interview with Former Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dist. Court
for the S. Dist. of N.Y. (Feb. 26, 2008).
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request.228  Members of the public who seek to access such docu-
ments must approach defense counsel or the U.S. Attorney’s
office.
1. First Amendment Right of Access Analysis
Like the Medium-Based position, the Exclusion approach pre-
sumably evades the strictures of the constitutional access jurispru-
dence because the requirements of the access doctrine attach only
when documents have been filed with the court.  For example,
though the Second Circuit’s decision in Haller determined that a
qualified First Amendment right of access attaches to plea agree-
ments, the holding apparently applies only when plea agreements
are filed:  “[t]he qualified first amendment right of access extends
to plea hearings and thus to documents filed in connection with
those hearings.”229  Similarly, the court in Lugosch held that a
qualified First Amendment right of access extends to “written doc-
uments filed in connection with pretrial motions,”230 while the
Biaggi holding was likewise limited to “documents filed in connec-
tion with pretrial motions.”231 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
49.1 also applies only to documents actually filed with the court.
Not only is the rule entitled “Privacy Protection for Filings Made
with Court,”232 but each subdivision explicitly addresses filed docu-
ments only.233
2. Common Law Right of Access Analysis
The Exclusion approach may also circumvent the common law
access doctrine.  In order to determine whether the common law
presumption of access attaches to a plea agreement, courts must
first consider whether the plea agreement qualifies as a “judicial
document.”234  This designation, in turn, requires that the plea
agreement be relevant to the performance of the judicial function
and useful in the judicial process.235  Satisfaction of these condi-
tions depends on when the court exercises a judicial function with
228. Id.
229. United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
230. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006) (em-
phasis added).
231. N.Y. Times Co. v. Biaggi, 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
232. FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1 (emphasis added).
233. See id.
234. See, e.g., Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119.
235. See id. at 119; see also Amodeo I, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995).
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respect to the plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11.236
Rule 11 creates three types of plea agreements based upon the
government’s agreed performance.237  Type A agreements are
those in which the government agrees to move for dismissal of the
defendant’s other charges.238  Type B agreements are those in
which the government agrees to recommend, or not oppose the de-
fendant’s request for, a particular sentence.239  Recommendations
under Type B are not binding on the court.240  Finally, Type C
agreements are those in which the government agrees that the de-
fendant should receive a specific sentence.241  Recommendations
under Type C are binding on the court upon acceptance of the plea
agreement.242  Critical to Type A and Type C agreements is the de-
fendant’s receipt of the specified performance.  Accordingly, the
court must ultimately take some form of action with respect to
these types of agreements:  the court may either accept or reject
the Type A and C agreements, or defer its decision as to accept-
ance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider
the defendant’s pre-sentence report.243
Judicial consideration of a plea agreement is thus marked by va-
rious stages in which the agreement may or may not qualify as a
judicial document to which a presumption of access would attach.
“Stage 1” may be said to include the period beginning with the
delivery of the plea agreement to the court, extending through the
court’s ministerial review of the document, and culminating in the
moment prior to any actual adjudication.  As Judge Weinstein de-
termined, because the common law right of access is based on the
policy goal of curtailing judicial abuse, the right should only extend
to materials upon which a judicial decision is based.244  Thus, judi-
cial review of a plea agreement, without more, does not transform
the agreement into a judicial document.245  Absent a judicial deci-
236. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
237. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(A)-(C).
238. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(A); see also United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670,
675 (1997).
239. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B); see also Hyde, 520 U.S. at 675.
240. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B).
241. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C); see also Hyde, 520 U.S. at 675.
242. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
243. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A).
244. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(citing Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980)).
245. See SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[TheStreet.com]
claims that the Confidential Testimony is a ‘judicial document’ because the Court
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sion, the details of the plea agreement are relevant not to the per-
formance of the judiciary, but to the performance of law
enforcement agencies in their dealings with the defendant.  Public
oversight of the executive branch neither requires nor justifies ac-
cess to judiciary records; the appropriate device is a Freedom of
Information Act request.246  In an analogous context, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit determined that the public does not
acquire a right of access to a plea agreement simply because the
trial judge examined the agreement to determine whether, if it
were eventually filed, it might be filed under seal.247  That a partic-
ular document becomes the subject of a proceeding to determine
whether a right of access exists does not create the very right in
question; “that is just bootstrapping.”248  Thus, because the plea
agreement at Stage 1 is not the subject of judicial action, it may not
be designated a judicial document to which the public right of ac-
cess attaches.
“Stage 2” on the continuum of plea agreement consideration
may be said to cover the interim ruling described in Rule
11(c)(3)(A), in which the court defers its decision to accept or re-
ject the agreement until after it has reviewed the pre-sentence re-
port.  The court’s deferral ruling does not appear to qualify as an
adjudicatory act that would transform the plea agreement at Stage
2 into a judicial document.  Implied in a deferral is the assertion
that the court does not, at that moment, have sufficient informa-
tion to render an ultimate decision.249  For example, in United
States v. Hyde, the United States Supreme Court determined that a
trial court may accept a guilty plea, and simultaneously defer its
decision on whether to accept the plea agreement pending comple-
reviewed it in order to decide whether or not to enter the protective order.  This
argument is without merit.  Indeed, the rule [TheStreet.com] urges us to adopt would
transform every document that a court reviews into a ‘judicial document’ presump-
tively open to the public, despite well-settled law to the contrary.”); see also United
States v. Wolfson, 55 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We are not aware . . . of any com-
mon-law principle that documents submitted to a court in camera for the sole purpose
of confirming that the refusal to disclose them to another party was proper, are to be
deemed judicial records open to the public.”).
246. See United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
247. Id. at 162.
248. Id.
249. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (“The judge may, and often
should, defer his decision until he examines the pre-sentence report. This is made
possible by Rule 32 which allows a judge, with the defendant’s consent, to inspect a
pre-sentence report to determine whether a plea agreement should be accepted.”).
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tion and review of the pre-sentence report.250  Such an administra-
tive “decision” does not, under the common law access doctrine,
equate with an adjudicatory decision.251  Stage 2 appears to entail
no decision within the meaning of the common law.  Thus, with
nothing judicial to document, the plea agreement at Stage 2 cannot
be considered a judicial document.252
“Stage 3” may be said to cover the moment in which the court
disposes of a plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(4) and (5), which
describe the procedures for acceptance and rejection of a proffered
agreement.  Two rationales explain why plea agreements transform
into judicial documents upon reaching Stage 3.  Rule 11(c)(2) re-
quires that the parties disclose the plea agreement in open court
when the plea is offered, unless the court, for good cause, orders in
camera disclosure.253  Moreover, Rule 11(c)(4) mandates inclusion
of Type A or C agreements in the judgment,254 while Rule
11(c)(5)(A)-(C) mandate a number of on the record disclosures
upon rejection of Type A or C agreements.255  Finally, under Rule
11(g), the proceedings during which the defendant enters a plea
must be recorded by a court reporter or by a suitable recording
device.256  The first rationale for the elevation of plea agreements
at Stage 3 to judicial document status is thus founded in the general
access-to-proceeding doctrine.  As the Supreme Court emphasized
in Craig v. Harney, “[w]hat transpires in the court room is public
property. . . . There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which
250. United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 678 (1997) (“Since the decision whether
to accept the plea agreement will often be deferred until the sentencing hearing . . . at
which time the pre-sentence report will have been submitted to the parties, objected
to, revised, and filed with the court. . . the decision whether to accept the plea agree-
ment will often be made at the same time that the defendant is sentenced.”).
251. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cryovac Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986).
252. See, e.g., El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d at 162.
253. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s
note (“[T]he basis of the bargain should be disclosed to the court and incorporated in
the record.  Without limiting that court to those we set forth, we note four possible
methods of incorporation:  (1) the bargain could be stated orally and recorded by the
court reporter, whose notes then must be preserved or transcribed; (2) the bargain
could be set forth by the clerk in the minutes of the court; (3) the parties could file a
written stipulation stating the terms of the bargain; (4) finally, counsel or the court
itself may find it useful to prepare and utilize forms for the recordation of plea
bargains.”).
254. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4).
255. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5)(A)-(C).
256. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(g).
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enables it . . . to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in
proceedings before it.”257
The adjudicatory nature of accepting or rejecting a plea agree-
ment also compels the Stage 3 transformation.  The Supreme Court
has long emphasized that a guilty plea is a “grave and solemn act,”
which may be “accepted only with care and discernment,”258 and
has also referred to “the adjudicative element inherent in accepting
a plea of guilty . . . .”259  An agreement that is accepted by the
court, and on which a guilty plea is entered, substitutes for the en-
tire trial.  As the D.C. Circuit noted in the First Amendment con-
text, the “public right of access to trials is undisputed in both its
importance and its historical pedigree. . . . It thus makes sense to
treat a completed plea agreement as equivalent to a trial, and
therefore as an item that ‘historically has been available.’”260 Simi-
larly, “where a plea agreement is offered to the court and rejected
. . . the rejection itself would presumably constitute a judicial act
that would be assessable by the public only by reference to the
agreement.  The agreement would therefore be a judicial document
to which the common law right would attach.”261
Once the plea agreement obtains status as a judicial document,
courts must next determine the weight to be accorded the resulting
presumption.262  In order to make this determination, courts must
examine, first, the role of the plea agreement in exercise of the
Article III judicial power, and second, the resultant value of the
plea agreement to those monitoring the federal courts.263
Whether the court actually relies on the plea agreement is not
dispositive in assessing the plea agreement’s role in the Article III
function.264  Instead, the test focuses on the party’s purpose for
submission: the presumption of access is entitled to great weight so
long as a party submits the document for the purposes of compel-
257. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947); see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1975); United States v. Graham, 257 F.3d 143, 152-53 (2d Cir.
2001).
258. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32
advisory committee’s note.
259. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
260. United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
261. Id. at 162 n.2 (emphasis added).
262. See, e.g., Amodeo II, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Sattar, 471 F. Supp. 2d 380, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
263. See, e.g., Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049.
264. Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006); see
also Sattar, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 386.
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ling the exercise of the court’s Article III duties.265  While disentan-
gling judges’ administrative and judicial roles may be complex in
other circumstances,266 a court’s role in the plea agreement context
is one steeped in the adjudicatory function.  Under Rule 11, the
plea agreement is necessarily submitted for the purposes of an
eventual disposition; as the Second Circuit noted, “the taking of a
plea is the most common form of adjudication of criminal litiga-
tion.”267  Congress explicitly delegated Rule 11 plea agreement re-
view and disposition to “the court,” and mandated that judges
undertake individualized and specific inquiries prior to disposition
of the plea, which could result in the defendant’s waiver of funda-
mental constitutional rights.268  Plea agreement disposal could not
be assigned to another body or institution, which further signifies
the inherent role of the plea agreement in the Article III
function.269
The second prong of the weight calculation requires an examina-
tion of the value of the plea agreement to those monitoring the
federal courts.  The common law has long aspired to achieve trans-
parency in criminal procedure in order to ensure the proper func-
tioning of a trial,270 the discouragement of perjury, misconduct, and
decisions based on partiality,271 the creation of an outlet for com-
munity concern, hostility and emotion,272 and finally, “respect for
the law” and a “strong confidence in judicial remedies.”273  As a
265. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 123.
266. See, e.g., In re Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 181 (1st Cir. 2003) (“‘This
Court has never undertaken to articulate a precise and general definition of the class
of acts entitled to [judicial] immunity. The decided cases, however, suggest an intelli-
gible distinction between judicial acts and administrative . . . functions that judges
may on occasion be assigned by law to perform.’”  (quoting Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219, 227 (1988))).
267. United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added); see
also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
268. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; see also Boston Herald, 321 F.3d at 192-93 (Lipez, J.,
dissenting).
269. In holding that certain papers did not qualify as judicial documents, the Boston
Herald court emphasized the limited role the documents would play in exercise of the
Article III function:  “[w]hile the review of [CJA eligibility documents] is conducted
by a district judge or magistrate judge, that role could have been assigned to another
institution.” Boston Herald, 321 F.3d at 189.
270. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 372-73 (Univ. of Chi. Press,
1979) (1800); see also MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF EN-
GLAND 343-45 (6th ed. 1820).
271. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (plurality
opinion).
272. Id. at 570 n.8.
273. Id. at 572.
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plurality of the Supreme Court noted in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, a “presumption of openness inheres in the very
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.”274  In the
sentencing context, then-Judge Kennedy of the Ninth Circuit noted
that “[p]ublic examination, study, and comment is essential if the
corrections process is to improve.  Those objectives are disserved if
the government conceals its position on so critical a matter as the
modification of a felony sentence in a celebrated case.”275  Thus,
once a plea agreement arrives at Stage 3, the document itself serves
the important function of allowing the public to monitor
prosecutorial and judicial conduct.276
The foregoing analysis indicates that plea agreements at Stage 3
are entitled to a weighty presumption of access.  Such plea agree-
ments appear to be most clearly analogous to documents that di-
rectly affect adjudications and play a significant role in determining
litigants’ substantive rights, which are accorded “the strongest pre-
sumption of public access.”277  By analogy, the character of plea
agreements at Stage 3 is closer to that of a report submitted as the
principal basis for summary judgment, to which a strong presump-
tion attaches,278 than to a document which plays a negligible role in
the performance of Article III duties, and which is therefore enti-
tled to a presumption that amounts to little more than a prediction
of public access absent a countervailing reason.279
However, because a plea agreement constitutes a contract280 be-
tween the defendant and the government that, with respect to the
recommendations in Type B agreements, is not binding upon the
judiciary, the court in its discretion could potentially determine
274. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 (plurality opinion).
275. CBS, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court (Takasugi), 765 F.2d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1985).
276. See United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing access to
plea agreements in First Amendment context); see also United States v. El-Sayegh,
131 F.3d 158, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
277. United States v. Sattar, 471 F. Supp. 2d 380, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
278. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he submission of mater-
ials to a court in order to obtain a summary judgment utterly precludes the assertion
of the attorney-client privilege or work-product immunity. . . .  Since it is the basis for
the adjudication, only the most compelling reasons can justify the total foreclosure of
public and professional scrutiny.”).
279. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995).
280. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“An attorney for the government and the de-
fendant’s attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a
plea agreement.  The court must not participate in these discussions.”); see also
United States v. Eppinger, 49 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Milken,
No. (S)89Cr.41, 1990 WL 263531, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1990) (“[I]n accepting the
plea agreement the court merely ratified the parties’ written agreement . . . .”).
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that the plea agreement deserves a lesser weight.  The weight of the
presumption for those documents situated in the middle of the con-
tinuum may be discerned in accordance with tradition.  Where such
documents are usually filed with the court and are generally availa-
ble, the weight of the presumption is stronger than where filing
with the court is unusual or is generally under seal.281  Under this
analysis, the court would note that plea agreements are not cus-
tomarily maintained in the public file in the Southern, Eastern and
Northern Districts of New York.  Accordingly, the resulting pre-
sumption would be accorded a low weight that could be more eas-
ily balanced away.
Despite the weight of the presumption of access that attaches to
plea agreements at Stage 3, potential countervailing factors may
nonetheless preclude disclosure.  For example, in certain instances,
a particular plea agreement may directly implicate the law enforce-
ment privilege, which is designed to protect the confidentiality, pri-
vacy and security of witnesses, cooperators and law enforcement
personnel, as well as to safeguard ongoing investigations.282  While
unlimited access to plea agreements may aid in the monitoring of
the courts, such access entails the potential cost of adversely affect-
ing law enforcement or judicial performance.283  Indeed, the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States cautioned that, because
“information regarding an individual’s cooperation with the gov-
ernment” could raise “personal security concerns,” such informa-
tion should be kept outside of the public file until the court has
ruled on any motion to seal.284  If the court in its discretion deter-
mines that disclosure of the plea or cooperation agreement at issue
is likely to cause persons “to resist involvement where cooperation
is desirable, that effect should be weighed against the presumption
. . . .”285
The Second Circuit has also acknowledged that privacy interests
may weigh heavily in the court’s balancing calculation.286  How-
281. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050.
282. Amodeo I, 44 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Dep’t of Investigation of
N.Y. v. Myerson, 856 F.2d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 1988).
283. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050.
284. GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 28. R
285. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050; see also id. at 1052 (“If such informants in the
present or future cases anticipate that their cooperation will likely become a matter of
public knowledge, valuable cooperation might cease.  However, Judge Patterson’s re-
dactions have satisfied those concerns.”).
286. See Gardner v. Newsday, 895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the com-
mon law right of access is qualified by recognition of privacy rights of those whose
intimate relations may be disclosed).
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ever, the right to personal privacy appears to be inoperative in the
context of plea agreements.  Privacy interests in the access jurispru-
dence are implicated by documents that relate to family affairs, ill-
nesses, and embarrassing conduct without public ramifications.287
Such private information is foreign to a defendant’s plea agree-
ment; as the Supreme Court noted in the First Amendment con-
text, the “commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and
judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions . . . are . . . events
of legitimate concern to the public . . . .”288
Thus, absent a statute which displaces the common law right of
access, the common law supports a presumption favoring disclo-
sure of plea agreements at Stage 3.  Depending upon the type of
plea agreement at issue, the presumption may be entitled to great
weight, against which the court may balance such countervailing
factors as the law enforcement privilege.  As the Supreme Court
noted in Nixon, “the decision as to access is one best left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in
light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular
case.”289
III. RECOMMENDATION
The Public is Public and Medium-Based approaches are unwork-
able in the Second Circuit.  The Public is Public model relies on
traditional sealing in order to protect litigant and innocent third
party privacy and security.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
49.1(d) defers to circuit case law on whether categorical sealing of
certain sensitive filings is permissible.290  The Second Circuit cur-
rently prohibits categorical sealing, and requires case-by-case de-
287. See Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051; see also United States v. Milken, 780 F. Supp.
123, 127-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that, in the First Amendment context, the defen-
dant had a privacy interest with respect to his family’s medical conditions, and that
the government had demonstrated an interest in maintaining the secrecy of certain
aspects of its discussions with defendant about ongoing and future criminal
investigations).
288. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975); see also United States v.
Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
289. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978); see also Wash. Post
Co. v. Hughes, 923 F.2d 324, 328 (4th Cir. 1991) (“Although appellate courts as well
may have insights on these issues, deference is owed the practical experience and
accumulated wisdom of a district court in this area.  Trial judges are also best situated
to understand the subtle factors unique to a given geographic area or population that
may either attenuate or enhance the effect of any particular disclosure upon a defen-
dant’s rights.”).
290. FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1 advisory committee’s note.
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terminations.291  Accordingly, courts within the Second Circuit may
not, consistent with precedent, adopt a local rule or protocol that
provides for sealing all plea agreements.
Moreover, the Second Circuit’s requirement that sealed filings
be notated on the docket292 could signal to potential data miners
the existence of government cooperation.293  Take, for example, a
hypothetical case with two co-defendants, one of whom is cooper-
ating with the government and has a sealed cooperation agreement
on file with the court.  Although data miners would be unable to
access the substance of the agreement, they would nonetheless be
“tipped-off” to the fact of cooperation by viewing a docket entry
that describes a sealed motion or filing.294  While “extraordinary
situations” may necessitate delay in docketing, the Second Circuit
requires that such a delay only be temporary.295  Relying on sealing
alone to safeguard the security of cooperating defendants may not
constitute an effective measure.
The Medium-Based approach, which would restrict nonparties’
remote electronic access to plea agreements, also appears to be un-
workable.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1(e) requires
that courts issue protective orders limiting or prohibiting nonpar-
ties’ remote access to court filings only on a case-by-case basis.296
Categorical restrictions on nonparties’ remote electronic access vi-
olate Rule 49.1, and should be invalidated under Federal Rule of
291. See, e.g., Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir.
2006).
292. United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Her-
ald Co. v. Klepfer, 734 F.2d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 1984).
293. PILOT PROJECT, supra note 54, at 26. R
294. Id. (“Here are some of the ways in which information about cooperating de-
fendants can be recorded.  If the government files a motion for a downward departure
based on substantial assistance to the government, for example, there will be entry in
the docket describing a government motion, and that motion may be described as a
motion by the government for downward departure.  If that motion is filed under seal,
it may be accompanied by a docket entry that describes a sealed motion.  Alterna-
tively, that sealed motion may not be recorded in the online docket.  The result is a
skip in the numbering of docket entries, which can be taken as evidence that a sealed
document was filed with the court.  If there is a hearing on that motion, it may be
sealed and recorded in the docket in a manner similar to that for the motion.  Either
way, a sealed document or a sealed hearing prior to sentencing may be evidence of
cooperation by the defendant.  Regardless of what is or is not sealed, the docket con-
tains information about the original charges and the sentence.  These two pieces of
information, when compared, may indicate that the defendant received a reduced sen-
tence in exchange for assistance to the government.”).
295. Klepfer, 734 F.2d at 103 n.7.
296. FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.1.
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Criminal Procedure 57.297  Accordingly, the adoption of categorical
medium-based approaches may not survive Rule 49.1.298
Even if the Medium-Based approach could comply with Rule
49.1, potential loopholes would remain.  A restriction on nonpar-
ties’ remote electronic access represents an incomplete solution,
since plea agreements would remain available to the public at the
courthouse.  Data miners eager to publicize the names of cooperat-
ing witnesses or undercover agents may not be deterred from trav-
eling to the courthouse and obtaining the relevant filing, and could
then convert the filing to an electronic format and disseminate it
over the Internet.  Moreover, data miners may solicit the services
of data-resellers, members of a “cottage industry” who would
profit by charging access fees to retrieve and deliver public court
documents.299  In its 2001 Report, the Judicial Conference recom-
mended the Public is Public approach specifically in order to pre-
vent the establishment of such a cottage industry.300  Finally,
restricting nonparties’ remote electronic access to sensitive filings
would favor nonparties located in proximity to the courthouse, and
would violate the Judicial Conference’s explicit policy of leveling
the “geographic playing field.”301
Rather than adopting either the Public is Public or Medium-
Based approaches, courts should not file plea agreements at all.
The act of filing a document with the court triggers the application
of the constitutional access doctrine.  Because the right of access
does not materialize until the time of filing, the policy of not filing
plea agreements circumvents the constitutional right of access alto-
gether.  Under common law jurisprudence, where legislation has
not displaced the common law right of access, a nonparty must es-
tablish that the presumption of access outweighs the security and
297. FED. R. CRIM. P. 57.
298. In support of the Medium-Based approach with respect to Rule 49.1, Judge
Bartle noted the following:
[W]e reviewed Rule 49.1(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  We
do not believe that it conflicts with what we have done.  Our protocol does
not deal with redaction of documents.  Again, we are simply removing from
our website certain documents which are still available in full in the Clerk’s
Office to the extent they are not under seal.
. . . We cannot lose sight of the fact that we are attempting to protect
people’s lives.  We strongly urge that we be permitted to continue with our
protocol and that we as well as other courts be allowed at this time to experi-
ment with efforts to combat the nefarious www.whosarat.com.
Privacy Policy Comments, supra note 210, ¶ 7-8. R
299. See 2001 REPORT, supra note 41. R
300. See id.
301. Id.
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privacy interests of the particular government cooperator.  In cases
in which such interests are paramount, the common law right of
access could potentially be balanced away.  Moreover, the practice
of not filing plea agreements avoids the requirements of Rule 49.1,
which mandates that courts make case-by-case determinations
when restricting nonparties’ remote access to filings.  The applica-
tion of the Exclusion approach is thus simple and efficient, and ap-
pears to withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment, the
common law, and Rule 49.1.
The Exclusion approach is certainly not a fail-safe solution.
Those seeking to disclose the names of government cooperators
may nonetheless obtain copies of non-sealed plea agreements
through defense counsel or the U.S. Attorney’s office.  However,
by not maintaining plea agreements in the public record and on
PACER, courts will, at the very least, frustrate the efforts of would-
be electronic data-miners.
CONCLUSION
Openness is one of the cornerstones of the American judicial
system.  The proliferation of PACER has, to a large extent, rein-
forced this cornerstone.  However, the ability to maintain a system
of unfettered access does not signify a duty to do so, and the con-
temporary security and privacy concerns associated with computer-
ized information storage and delivery should give pause.  Then-
Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in 1884 that trial proceedings
should be public, not because the controversies of one citizen with
another are of public concern, but because “it is of the highest mo-
ment that those who administer justice should always act under the
sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able
to satisfy himself . . . as to the mode in which a public duty is per-
formed.”302  Though circumstances have changed, the rationale for
public access has not.  Limiting nonparty access to plea agreements
by not filing such documents protects government cooperators’ se-
curity, as well as the efficiency of criminal trial procedure, without
violating Judge Holmes’ process-oriented rationale for openness.
Courts can best maintain the public’s qualified rights of access to
court filings based on process-oriented concerns, and simultane-
ously provide security to cooperators, by not filing plea
agreements.
302. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
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APPENDIX:  SURVEY OF THE ELECTRONIC ACCESS POLICIES OF
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS
A. Survey Methodology
Telephone interviews with the clerks of the U.S. district courts
and their staff members were conducted in October and November
2007.  Supplemental data were compiled from the U.S. Courts Pri-
vacy Policy Comments Page in February 2008.303  This survey cov-
ers ninety-one U.S. district courts.  The courts for the districts of
Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands were
excluded from the survey.
B. Survey Results
TABLE 1.  LISTING OF COMMON MODELS OF ACCESS TO PLEA
AGREEMENTS AND COURTS THAT APPLY THESE MODELS.
NO. / % COURTS
MODEL OF ACCESS DESCRIPTION (N = 91)
PUBLIC IS PUBLIC Plea agreements are remotely available to 65 / 71.4%
nonparties via PACER to the same extent that
they are available at the courthouse.
Courts applying this standard
M.D. Ala., N.D. Ala., S.D. Ala., D. Alaska, D. Ariz., W.D. Ark., C.D. Cal., E.D. Cal., D.
Colo., D. Conn., D. Del., D.D.C., M.D. Fla., N.D. Fla., N.D. Ga., S.D. Ga., D. Haw., D.
Idaho, N.D. Ill., S.D. Ill., N.D. Ind., N.D. Iowa, S.D. Iowa, D. Kan., E.D. Ky., W.D. Ky.,
W.D. La., D. Me., D. Mass., W.D. Mich., W.D. Mo., D. Mont., D. Neb., D. Nev., D.N.H.,
D.N.J., D.N.M., W.D.N.Y., M.D.N.C., W.D.N.C., N.D. Ohio, S.D. Ohio, E.D. Okla., N.D.
Okla., W.D. Okla., D. Or., M.D. Pa., W.D. Pa., D.P.R., D.R.I., D.S.C., E.D. Tenn., M.D.
Tenn., N.D. Tex., S.D. Tex., D. Utah, D. Vt., E.D. Va., W.D. Va., E.D. Wash., W.D. Wash.,
N.D. W. Va., S.D. W. Va., E.D. Wis., W.D. Wis.
MEDIUM-BASED In order to militate against the potential threats to 16 / 17.6%
security and privacy associated with the digital
realm, this model bars nonparty remote access to
plea agreements, but permits access to such
documents at the courthouse.
Courts applying this standard
E.D. Ark., S.D. Cal., S.D. Fla., M.D. Ga., C.D. Ill., E.D. La., M.D. La., D. Md., E.D.
Mich., D. Minn., E.D. Mo., E.D. Pa., D.S.D., W.D. Tenn., E.D. Tex., W.D. Tex.
EXCLUSION Plea agreements are treated as government 3 / 3.3 %
exhibits, and are not filed with the court. In
general, nonparties may only access plea
agreements via defense counsel or the U.S.
Attorney’s office.
303. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, COMMENTS RECEIVED BY THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR
COMMENT ON PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES (2007),
http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/2007comments.htm.
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Courts applying this standard
S.D.N.Y., E.D.N.Y., N.D.N.Y.
CATEGORICAL All plea agreements are sealed. This option, if 2 / 2.2%
SEALING undertaken without employing case-by-case
determinations, is inconsistent with Second Circuit
case law.
Courts applying this standard
N.D. Miss., S.D. Miss.
NON-SEALED, YET Plea agreements are filed, but classified as “Non- 1 / 1.1%
UNAVAILABLE Public Documents.” Nonparties may not access
plea agreements via PACER or at the courthouse.
This option is unworkable due to Second Circuit
case law and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
49.1.
Courts applying this standard
D. Wyo.
OTHER: Some courts employ approaches that do not fit 4 / 4.4%
within the above categories:
DISCRETIONARY Pursuant to General Order 45, counsel may 1 / 1.1%
MEDIUM-BASED designate plea agreements as “Limited Access
Filings.” Such documents may be retrieved at the
clerk’s office, but are not accessible by nonparties
via PACER.
Courts applying this standard
N.D. Cal.
SEALED PLEA Plea agreements are uniform so that the Internet 1 / 1.1%
AGREEMENT public cannot identify cooperating defendants. Plea
SUPPLEMENT agreements do not identify whether a criminal
defendant has agreed to cooperate with the United
States. A second document, entitled “Plea
Agreement Supplement,” must be filed under seal
in conjunction with every plea agreement.  If a
criminal defendant has agreed to cooperate, the
Plea Agreement Supplement must contain the
cooperation agreement. If the criminal defendant
and the United States have not entered into a
cooperation agreement, the Plea Agreement
Supplement will indicate that no such agreement
exists.  All plea agreements and Plea Agreement
Supplements must be presented to the Clerk’s
Office for filing either prior to the change of plea
hearing, or at the time of the change of plea
hearing, depending upon the preference of the
presiding Judge.
Courts applying this standard
D.N.D.
TEMPORAL Prior to arraignment, plea agreements are 1 / 1.1%
MEDIUM-BASED / classified as “Non-Public Received Documents,”
PUBLIC IS PUBLIC and only the court and parties may access them via
PACER. The docket does not reflect the existence
of the plea agreement at this time.  Following
arraignment, unsealed plea agreements are
docketed and are publicly available on PACER
and at the courthouse.
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Courts applying this standard
E.D.N.C.
TBD As of the time of this survey, criminal filings are 1 / 1.1%
not yet available on PACER. Unsealed plea
agreements are currently unavailable to nonparties
at the courthouse.  The District has not determined
whether plea agreements will be available to
nonparties via PACER once the service goes live.
The judges are currently discussing policy options
with the U.S. Attorney’s office.  One possibility is
filing a non-sealed plea agreement with general
language, and also filing under seal a plea
agreement supplement containing any cooperation
information.  Such a sealed supplement would be
filed regardless of whether there is cooperation in
order to combat the “red flag effect.”
Courts applying this standard
S.D. Ind.
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